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This paper presents a review of the environmental and design constralnts
along with some Ins|ght Into the established design and quality assurance
practices that apply to Low Earth Orbit (LEO) space flight hardware. It Is
intended as an introduction for people unfamiliar with space flight
conslderatlons. Some basic data and a bibliography are Included. Figures
from the literature are provided as examples of information that is available.
INTRODUCTION
Thls paper presents the basic design constraints that pertain to space
flight hardware. It includes guldellnes applicable to the development of
payloads for expendable launch vehicles (ELVs) and the space shuttle payloads.
This information is famillar to all space engineers, but the need exists for a
primer for those new to the field. The reader Is cautioned that much of this
paper reflects the author's convictions. The prospective space engineer |s
encouraged to become more familiar with the literature to form his own opinions
on the subject.
There are many aspects of the established design procedure for space
flight hardware that at first glance appear unduly Byzantlne; however, this
approach has developed over the years to meet the challenges of space f11ght
and has proved to be very successful. (See fig. I.) Designing hardware for
space use has unique problems that must be carefully addressed, and common
design practices have evolved to ensure success. Recently, many small shuttle
payload engineers have relearned the lessons of space fllght hardware design
from hard experience. (See Ridenoure, 1987.) The obstacles 11sted |n thls
paper may be avolded by the discerning and prepared space engineer.
The most obvious difference between other hardware deslgns and space
flight hardware designs is the effect of the space environment (vacuum, low
gravity, radiation, etc.) on hardware. A second class of equally difficult
challenges is presented by the limitations Imposed by the launch vehlcle. It
currently costs thousands of dollars per pound to put a payload in orbit, so
deslgnlng for mlnimum weight is critical. Other constraints, such as volume
and power, arise dlrectly and indlrectly from the launch vehicle. The third
general constraint, which is responsible for much of the intricacies of the
space flight design process, is reliabllity. There is little or no
opportunity for servicing space hardware in the event of a failure. This
means the hardware must be designed and tested so that it either will not fail
or will tolerate likely failures. The costs of reliability coupled with the
cost of launch are what make space fllght hardware so expenslve. An automobile
can be used as an example of the importance of reliability. If one bought a
new car and then had to discard it at the first failure, such as a clogged
filter, fouled spark plug, or flat tire, the economics of car ownership would
not be very attractive (especially if coupled with gasoline costs of $100 per
gallon). In space, the luxury of readily available and affordable servicing
does not currently exist.
ENVIRONMENTALCONSTRAINTS
Envlronmental effects are usually grouped Into the followlng categories:
(1) ground and prelaunch, (2) launch and ascent, and (3) space. For returning
spacecraft, a fourth category of reentry must also be considered, but thls last
category w111 not be addressed in this paper.
Ground and Prelaunch Environments
Before jumping to the difficulties of the space environment, it is
important to remember the more mundane environments that the hardware wlll
see before launch. These include ground handllng and storage environments,
transportation environments, and launch site environments. Some specific
considerations include the following: (I) electrostatic discharge due to
handling; (2) shock (e.g., impact due to dropping), vibration, temperature
range, atmospheric pressure drop, and humidity due to transportation; and
(3) effects of the launch environment such as salt spray, moisture,
temperature, sand and dust, fungus and mold growth, and lightning. If the
effects of these environments are ignored, the design may never have the
opportunity to prove itself in space.
The above conditions are most likely experienced by nonoperating
hardware. Operating condltions on the ground must also be considered. For
example, if the hardware has the potential for operating in an exploslve
atmosphere (e.g., due to a leak in a tank in a nearby system), safety
conslderations may require that the design be explosion proof. Verifying an
exploslon proof deslgn can add significant expense to development costs.
E1ectrostatlc discharge (ESD) refers to the possibility of damage to
electronic devices due to a dlscharge of static electricity. This effect is
not limited to space flight designs, as ESD susceptible parts (such as
Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor technology, or CMOS, which is
attractive for its low power consumption) are now commonly used in industry.
(See table I.) At1 low level or signal level parts should be handled with
care and the possibllity of hidden damage should not be overlooked.
Launch and Ascent Environment
The launch environment varies with the launch vehicle. All launch
vehicles impose acceleration on payloads (on the order of 5 or 6 g for an
unmanned launch vehicle and about 3.5 g for the space shuttle). Considerable
vibratlon is also present. For design, analysis, and testing purposes thls
vibration is typically split into the following three components for design,
analysis, and testing purposes" (1) quasi-static or sine, (2) random, and
(3) acoustic Vibration environments are typicaiiy Specified by spectrai
density. (See fig. 2.) The vibration that a piece of hardware will
experience depends on where and how the hardware is mounted. Acoustic
environments translate into vibration as sound pressure variations excite the
structure. Acoustic vibratlons vary depending on the shape of the hardware
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and material used. Shock due to pyrotechnic devices (such as for spacecraft
separation) is also a consideration.
On ascent there Is some temperature rlse due to aerodynamic heating and,
of course, a pressure drop. The pressure profile Is important for vented
enclosures and especially for operating electronics. The Paschen Law relates
sparking potential to pressure. The possibility for arcing in electronics of
even moderately high voltage occurs at low pressures encountered at some point
on the ascent pressure profile. This is only one of the reasons for
encapsulating electronlcs with an insulating material (known as conformal
coating). Sealed enclosures are possible, but they become pressure vessels in
vacuum, and maintalning the integrity of the seal is a challenge. A leaking
sealed enclosure will eventually evacuate and could implode if returned to a
pressurized envlronment.
Space Envlronment
The vacuum of space turns out to be a substantial factor in space hardware
deslgn. Although vestiges of the atmosphere cause significant aerodynamic drag
over time in LEO, the vacuum in LEO is better than in vacuum chambers on Earth.
The princlpal _mpacts on design are in heat transfer, material migration, and
materials degradation.
The thermal environment in space presents a challenge to the thermal
engineer, but to the individual hardware component manifests itself as a
radiation and conduction problem with a fairly w_de temperature range. (See
fig. 3.) It Is interesting to note that a spherlcally shaped gray body in
orbit wlll have an average temperature of around 20 to 40 °C. However,
temperatures reached by sun-faclng or deep-space-facing surfaces will differ
by a large amount and wide variations can take place as components move In and
out of sunlight. Many thermal cycles will be experienced as most spacecraft
go into eclipse once every orbit. Components on the frlnge of the spacecraft
(e.g., solar arrays) can experience extremely large temperature fluctuations.
Low power dissipation electronic components are preferred because heat
rejection capability Is limited by the radiator size. A significant degree of
thermal control can be achieved by the proper selection of surface coatings.
(See table II.)
Without gravity there is ne buoyancy-drlven convection (although there
may be surface-tension-driven convection), so heat transfer must be by
radiation or conduction (even _n sealed containers). Fans are a possible
solution to provide convectlon in sealed containers, but they require power,
represent a fallure mode, and do not help if the container leaks.
With the absence of convection, most practical heat removal from a
hardware component Is via conduction and radiation. For electronic piece
parts, conductlon is the primary mode of heat removal. Design for conduction
heat transfer usually entails good thermal conductivity and contact throughout
the system (e.g., using large mounting areas with many bolts and even the use
of thermally conductive fillers or adhesives). The area of conduction via
bolted joints in vacuum could benefit from more application-oriented research.
Although heat pipes or active thermal control systems are possible, reliability
and integration considerations do not encourage their use.
Low-g materlal migration is a problem of floating and wandering bits of
contamination with electrically conductive material being especlally
troublesome (another reason for conformal coating of electronics). Extensive
cleanliness and contamination control efforts are required. Material migration
in vacuum Includes the problems associated with outgassing, low vapor pressure
metals, contamlnatlon, and lubrication. Outgassing is the release of material
such as the evaporation of volatile components or the disabsorptlon of
entrained materials. This outgasslng can cause problems if the outgassed
material is deposited on optical or thermal control devices that rely on
surface optical properties to work. Outgassing in a confined area could result
In a pressure rise that exceeds the critical Paschen Law pressure which would
result in arcing. High vapor pressure metals, such as cadmium, grow whiskers
in vacuum which can cause electrical shorts (e.g., between connector pins).
Choosing a lubricant requires special care in vacuum because many common
lubrlcants become ineffective or migrate away from where they are needed and
become contaminants, while the surfaces to be lubricated will then gall or cold
weld.
Materials degradation arises from exposure to radiation and to atomic
oxygen in LEO. The main types of radiation that can damage materials are
ionizing radiation, protons, and ultraviolet radiation. Radiation effects are
not as much a concern on the ground because the Earth's atmosphere provides
attenuation. The Earth's trapped radiation belts are a source of proton
problems especially around the South Atlantic Anomaly, which is the name of a
dip In the Inner-radlatlon belt over South America. Electronics are
susceptible to a total dose of radiation that will cause total failure and at(
also susceptlble to temporary failures called slngle event upsets (SEU) or "b!
f11ps" caused by an ionlzlng particle passing through a partlcular location or
a chip (like a memory cell). Unpredictable radiation bursts can come from
solar flares. Atomic oxygen in low orbits will attack susceptible external
surfaces and can cause thermal system degradation, so proper materials must b(
selected for exposed surfaces.
Spacecraft charglng is an interesting effect that arises from space plas_
electrons charging dielectric surfaces. (Voltage differences of I0 000 V are
possible in eclipse.) Subsequent discharges from these potentials can cause
electronic system upsets. The harmful effects of charging can be avoided if
proper design practices are followed (e.g., ensure proper grounding and bondi
and provide conductive external surfaces).
One aspect of the LEO environment that is steadily getting worse and wil
present severe problems in the future is the presence of orbital debrls.
Meteoroids and micrometeoroids are of some concern; however, with the advent
of space flight, manmade debris from launch vehicles and spacecraft is
becoming a major hazard. The major design Impact is the need for shielding,
which adds costly weight. The required shield weight depends on the acceptab
probability of penetration of debris, which in turn depends on the distributi
of debris particles. At present, the debris environment is not accurately
characterized except that it is growing worse. There are many shielding desi
equations in the literature and they differ considerably.
DESIGN CONSTRAINTS
The prlnclpal design constraint for flight hardware Is weight. (Although
this Is properly referred to as mass, engineers tend to talk about weight and
it Is less confusing to stick with the argot.) There Is a limit on the amount
of payload weight that a launch vehicle can place In orbit. There Is also a
center of gravity (c.g., more properly center of mass) llmltation on the
payload due to launch vehicle bending moments.
These severe weight restrictions necessitate extreme measures to reduce
weight. Mass properties are watched closely throughout the stages of system
design and development with the maintenance of a weight budget. The welght
margin, governed by the project manager, Is whittled down over the course of
the project's development as subsystems fail to meet their weight allocations
due to underestimates or unforseen problems. This happens despite using
elegant and sophisticated design practices (e.g., by using lightweight
materials or chemically milling components to minimum allowable thlcknesses).
Factors of safety are typically pushed to their lower limits because of weight
constraints. The solutlons to many design problems also tend to add weight.
Weight is an underlying consideration In nearly all aspects of space design.
Electrlcal power Is a commodity that Is also closely watched by project
management. A power budget similar to the weight budget Is kept. The
limitation on power Is directly connected to welght. The power subsystem
tends to be very heavy due to items llke batterles, and power requlrements are
controlled carefully to keep the power subsystem weight down. Most spacecraft
obtain electrical power from solar cell arrays, which are limited in output by
weight and size constraints. They only produce power In sunlight and so must
be augmented by batterles to provide power In ec11pse. Thermal dlsslpatlon is
also a consideration in power constraints.
Volume is limited by the launch vehicle shroud. (See fig. 4.) Items such
as antennas and solar arrays are launched folded-up and deployed on orbit. In
the stowed configuratlon they are latched to prevent damage due to acceleration
and vibratlon. Mechanisms for latch release and boom extension are major
in-line rellability items for the entire spacecraft and are therefore carefully
designed. Pyrotechnic devlces are typically used in areas where high
reliability is needed, such as separation from the launch vehicle.
A consumables budget is kept for such items as propellants. Spacecraft
life Is usually limited by the amount of propellant carried and ranges
typically from l to 10 years. Even at 250 n mi altitude, there is slgnlficant
atmospheric drag which causes orbit decay which shortens the life of the
spacecraft or increases the need for propellants to provide thrust for drag
compensation. The longer the life, the more challenging the reliability goal
because of the greater time available for a failure to occur.
Because there are typlcally many electronic boxes in close proximity and
with shared power buses, electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) is an Important
issue. Electromagnetic interference (EMI) is hard to design out other than
uslng commonly accepted packaging, grounding, bonding, and shielding practices.
Electrical and electronic boxes are usually tested for EMC indlvidually to some
interference limits, but frequently compatibility problems are not apparent
until the whole system is tested together. EMI is usually divided into two
major categories: whether the box is susceptible to EMI and whether the box
causes Interference. In both cases, there is a further subdivision as to
whether the interference is radiated (electromagnetic waves) or conducted
(e.g., noise on the power bus).
The amountof data that can be downIinked to the ground is limited,
sometimes by spacecraft systems (e.g., antenna size or amplifier power) or by
relay systems. As an example, the multiple access data rate of the NASA
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System can be up to 50 kilobits per second.
Not all of the data capacity is necessarily available for the science payload
as someof the data allocation will probably be devoted to housekeeping data.
Housekeepingdata is used to determine the status and health of the various
subsystems, to determine failure causes, and to provide for engineering and
operational needs. UpIinked commandsare similarly a limited commodity and
are usually closely managedalong with the data requ!rements.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, are considerat_ons of safety,
reliability, and quality assurance (SR&QA). Costs tO launch a payload are
hlgh, costs to design and build space hardware are excessive, and costs to
repair hardware In space are currently unthinkable. Onecannot afford to have
a failure in orbit because there is no cheap, easy way to fix hardware in
orbit. The design has to be reliable and fault tolerant, and faults should
not propagate. Hardwareor system redundancy _s one method used, but the
ever-present weight constraint must be considered. All failure causes and
modeshave to be analyzed and their effects determined during the design
stage. For these reasons, reliability winds up being a major cost driver.
Safety has to be kept In mind throughout the design process. For
unmannedspacecraft, safety Is a primary concern during ground operations and
launch. Hazardous materials should be avoided becauseof the possibility that
a launch failure could introduce these materials into the environment. Range
safety mayrequire destruct devices on dangerous items such as propellant
tanks. Servicing of hardware on the launch pad is to be avoided. High
pressure systems pose a hazard and are not usually fully loaded until
personnel are finished working In the area. Ground cable and plumbing
connections, knownas umbiIicals, are available on the launch pad to handle
safety functions and ground operations.
The formal safety review process is just that, a review. The safety
committee will review the design to determine if everything possible has been
done to ensure a safe design, but will not generally tell how to design the
system to be safe. In manned space flight (shuttle) the safety constraints
are rigid and overriding. Safety becomes a major driver in system design and
forces many trades to be done in other areas in order to accommodate required
redundancy or fault tolerance.
DESIGN AND QUALITY ASSURANCE PRACTICES
The basic approach used to develop flight hardware is to (I) design
carefully, (2) analyze and verify the system on paper, (3) test thoroughly
(perhaps by building and destructively testing a quaIiflcation item or system),
and (4) rigidly control the flight hardware build and test process to conform
to the paper design. An incredible amount of paperwork Is generated by a
flight project. There is a common saying that if all the paper on a fllght
project were stacked up, there would be no need for a launch vehicle to get to
orb1t.
Once a document is established, It Is placed in configuration control.
Because of the interrelationshlps of all the parts of a complex system, it Is
Important to document, review, and control any and all changes to the design.
The formal configuration control process holds the system together.
Simpllclty should be the guiding 11ght for the design engineer. The
simpler design is usually more reliable. There are so many other complicating
factors that arise from design constraints and system interfaces that it is
Important not to introduce unnecessary complicatlons. Pyrotechnic actuators
are an example of a slmple, reliable device for one-shot applications that are
commonly used on spacecraft.
Because of the way a "minor" change can ripple through the system design,
detailed analysis is performed throughout the design process in order to get
the paper as perfect as possible. Because weight constraints dictate low
safety factors, detailed static and dynamic structural analysis and modeling Is
performed. Fracture control, stress corrosion, and fatigue must be accounted
for. Thermal analysis and modeling, stress analysis, hazard analysis, and
reliability analysis are performed in detall. Usually a "reliability number",
related to the probability of success, is developed for parts and then for
systems (e.g., per MIL-HDBK-217); it Is important to keep in mlnd that this
number is not absolute, but Is only useful In maklng relative comparisons.
Interfaces (e.g., for power, data commands, fluids, etc.) between the
spacecraft, carrier, launch vehicle, and ground services must be carefully
defined. It Is usually difflcult to add or modify an interface after the
negotiations between the various parties have been completed and the interfaces
defined. Sometimes a spacecraft will make an allocation of power, commands,
data, etc., which become a design constraint for the component in question.
As wlth most complex and expenslve system designs, there is a detailed
and formal deslgn review process. First there is a concept revlew at the
beginning of the design process to determine what the system Is to accomplish
and how to go about it. It is vital to determine and document the requirements
for the system as a whole, as well as for the individual components, as early
as possible. There are so many other constraints that it is prohibitively
expensive to figure out each step as It is reached. This may seem to be a
given, but it Is rare that a project starts out with adequately defined
requirements.
Because of the myriad deslgn considerations, a trade study approach Is
taken. The various considerations (weight, reliability, power, thermal,
component availability, etc.) have to be traded off against each other. This
Is done with an eye to minimizing the loss or "hit" to each while optimizing
the total system. Trade studies crop up continually as one or another budget
gets into trouble or the solution to a problem necessitates increased weight
and/or power consumption.
A Preliminary Design Review (PDR) is held to review preliminary versions
of drawings, specifications, plans, analysis, design criterla, and supporting
documents. The PDR provides a check that the design is going in the proper
direction before startlng the involved process of filling In and documenting
all the details of the design. Typically the PDRIncludes an overall system
specification, subsystemspecifications (whlch cover large subsets of the
system), and indivldual componentspecifications.
A Crltical Design Review (CDR) is held to review the finished design in
detail. Thls includes flnal versions of drawings, specification changes,
detailed procedures for testing and operation, detailed analysis and modellng,
and a truckload of supporting documentation. Everything is done on paper
first. The emphasis is on getting the paper design right, testing and
verifying It, and then carefully controlling the hardware throughout its life
according to the design documentation.
The paper mill does not stop with the design. As the flight hardware Is
built and tested, documentation is generated recording every aspect of the
hardware's life. All parts and materials used have a paper trail back to their
origins so that bad lots can be found and excised. The trail follows them
throughout their life to ensure they have been properly stored and tested and
that they are not stressed. Parts and materials of unknown origin are not even
allowed In the vicinity of flight hardware. All occurrences, tests, material
exposures, envlronmental exposures, and any other relevant information about
the history of a piece of hardware Is recorded in a log so that any future
failure can be properly analyzed and its cause determined.
To verlfy the design, qualiflcatlon units are built exactly corresponding
to the design documentation and are identical to flight units except that
thelr purpose Is to qualify the design for the environments to be experienced
by the flight units. These units are tested to their llmlts and are even
destroyed by the testing. In cases where the safety factor has been kept
large enough, a protofIight approach can be used where the qualiflcation unit
Is not overstressed in testing and is used for flight.
Testing Includes vibration, shock, thermal-vacuum (flg. 5), EMI, operating
llfe, proof or burst pressure, and tests for all environments and requirements
in the specification. Thermal-vacuum tests subject the hardware to thermal
cycles In vacuum between the specified extremes and check for outgassing; they
may Include a pump-down test to simulate ascent. Test results are documented
In detail and analyzed. Acceptance tests to verify workmanship are performed
to levels generally less than the qualification tests to avoid overstressing
the units and using up their useful life, but are nearly as extensive.
A preship revlew Is held after the hardware is built and tested to review
test results, failures and problems, and changes and to determine if the
hardware is ready to be shipped to the launch site. Of course, procedures for
ground operations at the launch site are well documented.
PARTS, MATERIALS, AND PROCESSES
Parts, materials, and process design considerations require significant
engineering effort to avoid system failures. The Government-lndustry Data
Exchange Program (GIDEP) provides data on failures from many projects.
Publications such as GIDEP Alerts are a good source for application experience
and potential problem information. Goddard Space Flight Center's "Materials
TIPS" Is an excellent source of information for spacecraft applications.
Some typlcal materlals problems include the followlng: Incompatible
materlals, attack by solvents and cleaning agents, change In properties due to
age or environments (e.g., radiation damage and atomlc oxygen attack),
expansion and shrinkage, defects, delaminatlon, poor adheslon, inadequate
plating or coatlng, embrlttlement, mercury contamination, stress corrosion,
fatigue, etc.
Incorrectly deslgned or Implemented processes can cause failures.
Soldering of electrical connections is a good example of a process that can
seriously affect rellability. Good solderlng, according to NHB 5300-4 (3A-I),
requlres the following: good workmanship (certiflcation is usually required),
proper environmental conditions, facility cleanliness, proper tools and
equipment, properly selected materla]s (solder, flux, solvents), proper
preparation of conductors, proper part mounting, application of the proper
amount of solder, removal of residue, and inspection. Stress relief and
materials compatibility are important. Detailed logs are kept to document
exact soldering conditions for each assembly, and the amount of the paper
Involved In assuring quality soldering is enormous.
Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanlcal (EEE) parts pose a special
challenge to the space engineer. There is a NASA Standard EEE Parts List,
MIL-STD-975, but the list Is very llmited and tends to lag behind the state of
the art by many years. (See table III.) This is because the standard parts
are usually those with a flight history (i.e., they have flown in space). In
the space business, once something has flown, it becomes imbued with a magical
aura of success. Thls Is understandable as flight Is the ultlmate test.
However, in the case of parts, thls aura Is dangerous as performance depends
on the application of the part and also on the degree to which the part
manufacturing process remains the same. A standard part may not be right for a
particular application and may not meet certain requirements. For example, the
standard parts list had not yet addressed radiation susceptibility in its
recent Revlslon G.
Military speclflcations and standards are frequently used in space flight
projects in all deslgn disciplines. NASA "Grade I" parts correspond to "S
level" military parts and are acceptable for flight use. "Grade 2" parts
correspond to military "B level" parts. The Joint Army Navy (JAN)
specifications cover high reliability military EEE parts. There are military
specifications and qualified parts lists (QPLs) covering various types of
parts (e.g., MIL-M-38510 for microcircuits, MIL-S-19500 for transistors and
diodes). Not only the part, but the manufacturer must be certified to get on
a QPL. "Slash Sheets" are issued for individually approved parts that are
appended to the specification. The test methods specified by the QPLs are
given in MIL-STD-883. MIL-STD-883C not only specifies test methods, but also
lists requirements that a part must meet in order to use the term MIL-STD-883
in advertising. Thus, a MIL-STD-883 part is "better" than a commercial part,
but is still a nonstandard part. Military specifications and standards are
frequently used in space flight projects in all design disciplines. Testing
and screening of non-QPL parts can help build confidence in their use to some
degree, but use of a nonstandard part usua]ly entails a lot of paperwork.
Table IV shows the current relationship between NASA standard parts and
m11itary specifications. In the near future, Applicatlon Specific Integrated
Circuits (ASlCs) will cause a rethinking of parts qualification. It may be
desirable to qualify a programmable 1oglc device in the exact configuration in
which it will fly rather than allowing a generic qualiflcation. MIL-I-38535
specifles Qualified Manufacturer's Line (QML) requirements, which essentially
qualify a process independent of the types of parts being built. Although
QMLs were conceived to support ASICs, they may wind up being used to make
near-Level B parts.
CMOS electronic parts are deslrable because of their Inherent low power
consumptlon, but they are susceptible to ESD and radiation effects. In some
CMOS parts, a parasitic SCR (silicon controlled rectif_er) can be activated by
a power glitch or cosmic ray causing potentially destructive "latch-up."
Anomalous "bit-flips" (SEU) can occur due to charged particle radiation passing
through the device. NMOS (n-channel Metal Oxide Semiconductor) devices are
generally more susceptible to total dose radiation damage, some failing after
exposure to doses less than lO00 tad (si).
Parts are derated to avoid stresslng. (See table V.) Appendix A of
MIL-STD-975 gives a general g:ulde to deratlng, but each particular application
of a part has to be examined to determine the proper deratlng. (For example,
capacitive load versus inductlve load could make a difference as to the amount
of derating necessary for a relay.) Norst case analysis is performed on the
circuit to determine if any parts could be overstressed in each particular
application. A thermal analysis identifies hot spots and calculates junction
temperatures for individual parts. Nire and fuse selection and sizing have to
be carefully considered for use in the unusual thermal environment of space.
The same conservatism that makes fllght-proven parts acceptable applles
to flight hardware in general and, at the electronic box level, makes more
sense because the application situation may not vary as much. This has led to
several efforts in the past to develop standardized hardware that could be
used on many different spacecraft. To make somethlng that is all _hlngs to
all people is to make it so expensive that no one can afford to use it. It Is
also hard to make trades when working around standard hardware with fixed
weight and power specs. If the hardware is not exactly right for an
application, the design engineer may have to make some modifications that can
wind up being as expensive as designing a new item. Conservatism will lead to
the standard item being older, proven technology with its higher weight and
power limitations. The adage "if it works, don't touch it" points out the
diffIcultles of modernizing. On the face of it, standardization appears to
offer savings in development costs, deslgn time, and the possibility of
quantity buys. Unfortunately, it has not worked out that way. Each spacecraft
has its own unlque problems and solutions. This is not to say that one must
start from scratch on each design; it is helpful to use as much existing design
as possible from other projects. For example, 28 V dc power systems are
frequently encountered, so it is best to stick with that voltage to allow the
use of existing electrical/electronic boxes.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper llsts some of the major problem areas and provides a
bibliography for a starting point for those unfamiliar with space hardware
design. The design of hardware for space flight use is really a rather
straightforward job once all the unusual design constraints have been
recognized. At this time, space engineering depends on experienced people who
lO
have learned their lessons the hard way; the design criteria is just now
startlng to become well documented in the llterature. Hopefully, in the
future it will not be as difficult to dig up the little tidbits of information
that are needed to stay out of trouble in even the slmplest design sltuatlons.
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spacecraft. Contains a helpful amount of detail on the design of the
various subsystems even though it is a conceptual design document
because it builds on the two previous HEAO designs.
Space Environment
Jursa, A.S., ed.: Handbook of Geophysics and the Space Environment.
ed. Air Force Geophysics Laboratory, 1985.
A general overview of the space environment.
Fourth
Lehmann, J.; Tanner, S.G.; and Wilkesson, T., eds.: The Shuttle Environment
Workshop. (Rept. 24-5087 Systematics General Corp.; NASA Contract NAS5-27362.)
NASA CR-170496, 1983.
Contains data on shuttle environments from the early flights.
Leger, L.3.; Vlsentlne, J.T.; and Kumlnecz, J.E.: Low Earth orbit Atomlc
Oxygen Effects on Surfaces. AIAA TP-84-0548, Jan. 1984.
Contalns additlonal data on atomic oxygen effects from STS-5 and
STS-8 f11ghts.
Cour-Palals, B.G.: Hypervelocity Impact Investigations and Meteoroid Shielding
Experlence Related to Apollo and Skylab. Orbital Debris, NASA CP-2360, 1985,
pp. 247-275.
There is a dearth of hard data in this area. This paper presents
some useful Informatlon.
Watts, J.W., Jr.; and Wright, J.J.: Charged Particle Radiation Environment for
the Spacelab and Other Missions in Low Earth Orbit - Rev. A. NASA TM X-73358,
1976.
Estimates of the radiation environment in LEO.
Purvls, C.K. et al.: Design Guidelines for Assessing and Controlling
Spacecraft Charging Effects. NASA TP-2361, 1984.
A general overview of design criteria for spacecraft charging with an
extensive bibliography.
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Parts, Materials, and Processes
Material Branch, NASA GSFC: Materials TIPs for Spacecraft Applications. NASA
Goddard Space Flight Center.
A compendium of mlscellaneous information that makes for fasclnatlng
reading.
Tlrado, J.S.; and Hi-tel ICs: A Class of Difference. Electronic Engineerlng
Times, no. 15, July II, 1988, pp. T24-T48.
A good introduction to the world of military parts.
McNulty, P.J.: Radiation Effects of Electronic Systems, Proceedings of the
Air Force Geophysics Laboratory Norkshop on the Earth's Radiation Belts,
Jan. 26-27, 1981, R.C. Sagalyn, N.N. Spjeldvik, and N.J. Burke, eds., Air Force
Geophysics Laboratory, Hanscom, MA, 1981, pp. 99-124.
A good introduction to radiation effects on electronic parts.
Although the paper Is dated, standard electronic parts are also
dated.
MIL-STD-975G, NASA Standard Electrical, Electronics, and Electromechanlcal
(EEE)
Parts List.
The EEE parts that many space hardware designs are required to use.
Parts, Materials and Processes Experience Summary, vol. 2, NASA SP-6507, 1973.
A compendium of Information from the Government-Industry Data
Exchange Program (GIDEP). A handy reference, but the GIDEP ALERT
reports are more entertaining and timely.
MIL-HDBK-5, Metallic Materials and Elements for Aerospace Vehicle Structures,
Rev. D, 1983.
MIL-HDBK-17, Plastics for Aerospace Vehicles, Rev. A, 1971.
Data on structural properties of materlals.
Zerlaut, G.A.; Carroll, N.F.; and Gates. D.W.: Spacecraft Temperature-Control
Coatings: Selection, Utilization, and Problems Related to the Space
Environment Spacecraft Systems. Proceedings of the 16th IAF Congress, vol. l,
M. Lunc and D. Cautheir-Villard, eds., Gordon and Beach, New York, 1966,
pp. 259-313.
An introduction to thermal control. Although dated, it appears to
be the source of the ubiquitous figure showing the availability of
materials to provide various combinations of optical properties.
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Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance
Ridenoure, R.W.: A Systems-Level Performance History of Get Away Specials
After 25 Space Shuttle Missions. The 1986 Get Away Speclal Experimenter's
Symposlum, L.R. Thomas and F.L. Mosier, eds., NASA CP-2438, 1987, pp. 79-86.
A fascinating summary of GAS payload performance with a list of
failure causes. It appears that GAS payload designers relearned a
good deal of space engineering the hard way.
KHB 1700.7, Space Transportation System Payload Ground Safety Handbook.
Presents the detailed safety requirements a payload and ground
support equipment (GSE) must meet during ground operations.
NHB 1700.7, NASA Headquarters, Safety Policy and Requirements for Payloads
Using the Space Transportation System. NASA TM-80469, 1979.
Presents the safety policy for the STS.
MIL-STD-1540B, Test Requirements for Space Vehicles.
Describes the kind of testing that could be required for a
space-flight program.
Bloomqulst, et a1.: On-Orblt Spacecraft Reliability. PRC R-1863, P1annlng
Research Corporation, 1978.
Contains failure rate estimates based on historical spacecraft
reliability data.
Electromagnetic Compatibility, ESD, and Bonding
MIL-STD-461B, Electromagnetic Emission and Susceptibility Requirements for the
Control of Electromagnetic Interference.
Presents basic box level EMC requirements. Class A2 covers
spacecraft.
MIL-STD-462, Electromagnetic Interference Characterlstics, Measurement of.
Descriptions of the tests to be performed to determine if a unit
meets the requirements of MIL-STD-461.
DOD-STD-1686, Electrostatic Discharge Control Handbook for Protection of
Electrlcal and Electronic Parts, Assemblies and Equipment <Excludlng
Electrically Initiated Explosive Devices).
Includes an overview of ESD.
MIL-B-SO87B, Bonding, Electrical, and Lightning Protection, for Aerospace
Systems.
Spacecraft requirements are usually for Class R bonding.
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Hawklns, K.: SpaceVehicle and Associated SubsystemWeight Growth. Presented
to 47th Annual Conference of the Society of Allied Welght Englneers Inc.,
Detroit, Michigan, May23-25, 1988.
Contalns some historlcal data on weight growth of spacecraft from
concept to launch.
Mi1|tary documents may be available from:




TABLEI. - PARTCONSTITUENTSSUSCEPTIBLETO ESD
[From DOD-HDBK-263.]
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- PARAMETERS FOR SELECTED SPACECRAFT
SURFACE MATERIALS
SP-8027, spacecraft radlation torques,
1969.]
MatenaJ Reflectance, En_ttanc_
0.6 to 2.0 microns al room leml_rature , So_ax
I mi,."rem absorptance
W11_|e painUl
Y_tite prints exposed to Sun
l_ck paints
N,.'k pt/nu exposed to
White paJnu after nuclear
radizticm
|norpnic _int
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Oxidized stainleu steel at
10(30" C
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aAdapted rlom _fL 21 aa,.,4 26.
I_t,llu_. a_ :lppro,_it_lle, mlrr_ed to he.. *ndl_attw: and o_t for deign Uqr
glClO_, 0.6 m_.'t_n, • _halrp dq,-_'rea_: Ill _,'_e, tar, L'¢ o_'ur_
17
TABLE III. - EXAMPLE OF STANDARD PARTS LISTED IN MIL-STD-975G
[Note the "slagh sheet" numbers and the lack of Grade I parts.
Parts policies must account for the unavailab111ty of hlgh
rellabillty parts.]













































I/ Use the JANM3B5]O part numher for ordering.
_/ The * Is for choice of package style. The X is for choice of lead finish.
specific choices.
Refer to the QPL for
TABLE IV. - EEE PARTS CORRESPONDENCE
MILITARY QPL (See Note at Bottom)
DIODES &
NASA STANDARD ICs TRAN$1STORS
Grade I Established
MIL-S-385IO MIL-S-I9500 Reliability (ER)








Level S (or R)








JANTX Level M Level M
JAN Level L MIL-R-II
JAN - Joint Army Navy
QML - Qualified Manufacturer's List
Note: The NASA Standard EEE Parts are a subset of the military QPL parts; that is, not all military Level B parts are




TABLE V. - EXAMPLE OF A DERATING GUIDE FROM
MIL-STD-975G, APPENDIX A-I a
Wire F}erateto - Amperes Maximum
'_Size !




































I. Current ratings for bun-
dles or cables are based
on bundles of 15 or more
wires at +70°C in a hard
vacuum. For smaller
bundles, the allowable




2. Derdtings listed are for
Teflon insulated wire




For 150°C wire, use
80% of value shown
in table.
For 135°C wire, use
70% of value shown
in table.
c. For I05°C wire, use
50% of value shown
in table.
aThese guldellnes should be used as mlnlmum
deratlng crlterla and should be evaluated
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FIGURE 3. - AN EXTREME EXAMPLE OF THERMAL CYCLING EXPERI-
ENCED ON ORBIT IS GIVEN BY THIS PLOT OF THE TEMPERATURE
OF TIIE NIMBUS 2 SOLAR ARRAYS. THE BODY OF THE SPACE-
CRAFT HAS MORE MASS AND CAN BE INSULATED TO MODERATE THE
SWINGS IN TEMPERATURE. (FROM NASA SP-8074, SPACECRAFT
SOLAR CEtL ARRAYS, MAY 1971. )
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"*The plot shows l_ hours fo, each femD4tfoture !ronl_tlon; ocfuo_Jy, the t¢onl;I;on periods vary wldel¥ w;th _cecrofl,
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FIGURE 5. - TYPICAL THERMAL-VACUURTEST CYCLE FOR PROTO-
TYPE SPACECRAFT. (FROM NASA SP-8105, SPACECRAFTTHERMAL
CONTROL, MAY 1973.)
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